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We study the measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) in practice
with limited resource, when there are only 3 different states in implementing the decoy-state method.
We present a more tightened explicit formula to estimate the lower bound of the yield of two-
single-photon pulses. Moreover, we show that the bounding of this yield and phase flip error of
single photon pulse pairs can be further improved by using other constraints which can be solved
by a simple and explicit program. Results of numerical simulation for key rates with both the
improved explicit formula and the program are presented. It shows that the results obtained with
our methods here can significantly improve the key rate and secure distance of MDI QKD with only
three intensities.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Security for real set-ups of quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1, 2] has become a major problem in the area
in the recent years. The major problems here include
the imperfection of source and the limited efficiency of
the detection device. The decoy state method [3–12] can
help to make a set-up with an imperfect single photon
source be as secure as that with a perfect single photon
source [13, 14].
Besides the source imperfection, the limited detection
is another threaten to the security [15]. Theories of the
device independent security proof [16] have been pro-
posed to overcome the problem. However, these theories
cannot apply to the existing real set-ups because viola-
tion of Bell’s inequality cannot be strictly demonstrated
by existing set-ups.
Very recently, an idea of measurement device indepen-
dent QKD (MDI-QKD) was proposed based on the idea
of entanglement swapping [17, 18]. There, one can make
secure QKD simply by virtual entanglement swapping,
i.e., Both Alice and Bob sends BB84 states to the relay
which can be controlled by un-trusted third party (UTP).
After the UTP announced his measurement outcome, Al-
ice and Bob will post select those bits corresponding to a
successful event and prepared in the same basis for fur-
ther processing. In the realization, Alice and Bob can re-
ally use entanglement pairs [17] and measure halves of the
pair inside the lab before sending another halves to the
UTP. In this way, the decoy-state method is not necessary
even though imperfect entangled pairs (such as the states
generated by the type II parametric down conversion) are
used. Even though there are multi-pair events with small
probability, these events do not affect the security. Alice
and Bob only need to check the error rates of their post
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selected bits. However, in our existing technologies, high
quality entangled-pair-state generation can not be done
efficiently. In the most matured technology, the genera-
tion rate is lower than 1 from 1000 pump pulses. If we
want to obtain a higher key rate, we can choose to di-
rectly use an imperfect single-photon source such as the
coherent state [18]. If we choose this, we must implement
the decoy-state method for security. This has been dis-
cussed in Ref. [18], and calculation formulas for the prac-
tical decoy-state implementation with only a few different
states was first presented in [19], and then further studied
both experimentally [20–22] and theoretically[23? –26].
In particular, Tittel’s group[20, 21] did the MDI QKD
experiment with 3 intensities[19], in the laboratory over
more than 80 km of spooled fiber, as well as across dif-
ferent locations within the city of Calgary. By develop-
ing up-conversion single-photon detectors with high effi-
ciency and low noise, Liu et al did it over a 50-km fiber
link[22] and transmitted a 24192-image with one-time
pad protocol. The pioneering experiments in Calgary[20]
and in Shanghai[22] make a big step towards the final goal
of real application because they clearly show the practi-
cal feasibility of MDI QKD. Sun et al[24] presented a
variant formula of 3-intensity MDI QKD with numerical
simulation. However, the earlier formula[19] actually be-
haves better than Sun et al result. Xu et al[25] studied
the more general case when each sides use 3 non-vacuum
states. One can see that the major formula there is iden-
tical with the one in Ref.[19] in the case when the weakest
pulse is vacuum and both sides use the same 3 intensities.
Qin and Wang[23] and Zhou et al[26] studied the MDI
QKD with heralded single-photon sources. Curty et al
studied some finite-key effects[27].
There are two directions for the future study of the
MDI QKD. One is to improve the experimental tech-
niques, so as to improve the robustness and efficiency.
The other is to upgrade the theoretical results so as to
obtain a higher key rate given the same experimental
data.
2Here in this work, we shall first give better explicit for-
mulas of 3-state decoy-state method for the MDI-QKD .
We then estimate the infimum of yield and the supremum
of error rate single-photon pulse pairs to the UTP with
a simple and efficient program. In the fifth section, we
present the numerical simulations. The article is ended
with a concluding remark.
II. DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH ONLY 3
STATES FOR MDI-QKD
In the protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-pulse
state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is
controlled by an UTP. The UTP will announce whether
the pulse-pair has caused a successful event. Those bits
corresponding to successful events will be post-selected
and further processed for the final key. Since real set-
ups only use imperfect single-photon sources, we need
the decoy-state method for security.
We assume Alice (Bob) has three sources, oA, xA, yA
(oB , xB, yB) which can only emit three different states
ρoA = |0〉〈0|, ρxA , ρyA (ρoB = |0〉〈0|, ρxB , ρyB ), respec-
tively, in photon number space. Suppose
ρxA =
∑
k
ak|k〉〈k|, ρyA =
∑
k
a′k|k〉〈k|; (1)
ρxB =
∑
k
bk|k〉〈k|, ρyB =
∑
k
b′k|k〉〈k|, (2)
and we request the states satisfy the following very im-
portant condition:
a′k
ak
≥
a′2
a2
≥
a′1
a1
;
b′k
bk
≥
b′2
b2
≥
b′1
b1
, (3)
for k ≥ 2. The imperfect sources used in practice such as
the coherent state source, the heralded source out of the
parametric-down conversion, satisfy the above restric-
tion. Given a specific type of source, the above listed
different states have different averaged photon numbers
(intensities), therefore the states can be obtained by con-
trolling the light intensities. At each time, Alice will ran-
domly select one of her 3 sources to emit a pulse, and so
does Bob. The pulse form Alice and the pulse from Bob
form a pulse pair and are sent to the un-trusted relay. We
regard equivalently that each time a two-pulse source is
selected and a pulse pair (one pulse from Alice, one pulse
from Bob) is emitted. There are many different two-pulse
sources used in the protocol. We denote αβ for the two
pulse source when the pulse-pair is produced by source α
at Alice’s side and source β at Bob’s side, α can be one
of {oA, xA, yA} and β can be one of {oB, xB, yB}. For
example, at a certain time j Alice uses source oA and
Bob uses source yB, we say the pulse pair is emitted by
source oAyB.
In the protocol, two different bases, Z basis consist-
ing of horizontal polarization |H〉〈H | and vertical polar-
ization |V 〉〈V |, and X basis consisting of pi/4 and 3pi/4
polarizations are used. The density operator in photon
number space alone does not describe the state in the
composite space. We shall apply the the decoy-state
method analysis in the same basis (e.g., Z basis or X ba-
sis) for pulses from sources xA, xB, yA, yB. Therefore we
only need consider the density operators in the photon
number space. For simplicity, we consider pulses from
source prepared in Z basis first.
According to the decoy-state theory, the yield of a cer-
tain set of pulse pairs is defined as the happening rate of
a successful event (announced by the UTP) correspond-
ing to pulse pairs out of the set. Mathematically, the
yield is n/N where n is the number of successful events
happened corresponding to pulse pairs from the set and
N is the number of pulse pairs in the set. Obviously, if
we regard the pulse pairs of two-pulse source αβ as a set,
the yield Sαβ for source αβ is Sαβ =
nαβ
Nαβ
, where nαβ is
the number of successful events happened corresponding
to pulse pairs from source αβ and Nαβ is the number of
times source αβ are used. In the protocol, there are 9
different two-pulse sources. The yields of these 9 sources
can be directly calculated from the observed experimen-
tal data nαβ and Nαβ. We use capital letter Sαβ for these
known values.
We can regard any source as a composite source that
consists of many (virtual) sub-sources, if the source state
can be be written in a convex form of different density
operators. For example, two-pulse source yAyB includes
a sub-source of pulse pairs of state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 (ρ1 = |1〉〈1|)
with weight a′1b
′
1. This is to say, after we have used source
yAyB for N times, we have actually used sub-source of
state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 for a′1b
′
1N times, asymptotically. Similarly,
the source xAxB also includes a sub-source of state ρ1⊗ρ1
with weight a1b1. These two sub-sources of state ρ1 ⊗ ρ1
must have the same yield s11 because they have the same
two-pulse state and the pulse pairs are randomly mixed.
Most generally, denote s, s′ as the yields of two sets of
pulses, if pulse pairs of these two sets are randomly mixed
and all pulses have the same density operator, then
s = s′ (4)
asymptotically. This is the elementary assumption of the
decoy-state theory.
In the protocol, since each sources are randomly cho-
sen, pulses from each sub-sources or sources are also ran-
domly mixed. Therefore, the yield of a sub-source or a
source is dependent on the state only, it is independent
of which physical source the pulses are from. Therefore,
we can also define the yield of a certain state: whenever
a pulse pair of that state is emitted, the probability that
a successful event happens. Denote
Ωαβ = ρα ⊗ ρβ (5)
for a two-pulse state. The yield of such a state is also
the yield of any source which produces state Ωαβ only,
or the yield of a sub-source from any source, provided
that the state of the pulse pairs of the sub-source is Ωαβ .
3Note that, we don’t always know the value of yield of a
state. Because we don’t know which sub-source was used
at which time. We shall use the lower case symbol sα,β
to denote the yield of state Ωα,β. In general, the yields of
a sub-source (a state), such as s11 is not directly known
from the experimental data. But some of them can be
deduced from the yields of different real sources. Define
ρ0 = |0〉〈0|. According to Eq.(4), if α ∈ {0, xA, yA} and
β ∈ {0, xB, yB}, we have
sαβ = Sα˜β˜ (6)
with the mapping of α˜ = (oA, xA, yA) for α = (0, xA, yA),
respectively; and β˜ = (oB , xB , yB) for β = (0, xB, yB),
respectively. To understand the meaning of the equation
above, we take an example for pulses from source yAyB.
By writing the state of this source in the convex form
we immediately know that it includes a sub-source of
state ρ0⊗ρyB . By observing the results caused by source
yAyB itself we have no way to know the yield of this sub-
source because we don’t know exactly which time source
yA emits a vacuum pulse when we use it. However, the
state of this sub-source is the same with the state of the
real source oAyB, therefore the yield of any sub-source of
state ρ0 ⊗ ρyB must be just the yield of the real source
oAyB, which can be directly observed in the experiment.
Mathematically, this is s0yB = SoAyB , where the right
hand side is the known value of yield of real source oAyB,
the left hand side is the yield of a virtual sub-source from
real source yAyB.
Our first major task is to deduce s11 from the known
values, i.e., to formulate s11, the yield of state |1〉〈1| ⊗
|1〉〈1| in capital-letter symbols {Sαβ}. We shall use the
following convex proposition to do the calculation.
Denote S to be the yield of a certain source of state Ω.
If Ω has the convex forms of Ω =
∑
αβ cαβΩαβ , we have
S =
∑
α,β
cαβsαβ . (7)
This equation is simply the fact that the total number
of successful events caused by pulses from a certain set
is equal to the summation of the numbers of successful
events caused by pulses from each sub-sets.
Consider the convex forms of source xAxB , xAyB,
yAxB and source yAyB. Without causing any ambigu-
ity, we omit the subscripts A and B in the following of
this paper. Explicitly,
S˜xx = a1b1s11 + a1b2s12 + a2b1s21 + a2b2s22 + Jxx, (8)
S˜xy = a1b
′
1s11 + a1b
′
2s12 + a2b
′
1s21 + a2b
′
2s22 + Jxy, (9)
S˜yx = a
′
1b1s11 + a
′
1b2s12 + a
′
2b1s21 + a
′
2b2s22 + Jyx,(10)
S˜yy = a
′
1b
′
1s11 + a
′
1b
′
2s12 + a
′
2b
′
1s21 + a
′
2b
′
2s22 + Jyy,(11)
where
S˜xx = Sxx − a0S0x − b0Sx0 + a0b0S00, (12)
S˜xy = Sxy − a0S0y − b
′
0Sx0 + a0b
′
0S00, (13)
S˜yx = Syx − a
′
0S0x − b0Sy0 + a
′
0b0S00, (14)
S˜yy = Syy − a
′
0S0y − b
′
0Sy0 + a
′
0b
′
0S00, (15)
and
Jxx =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
ambnsmn, Jxy =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
amb
′
nsmn,
Jyx =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
a′mbnsmn, Jyy =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
a′mb
′
nsmn,
with J0 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1,m + n ≥ 4, (m,n) 6=
(2, 2)}.
In order to get a lower bound of s11, we should derive
the expression of s11 with Eqs.(8-11) firstly. Combining
Eqs.(8-10), we obtain the expression of s11 by eliminating
s12 and s21 such that
s11 = s
(123)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J1
f
(123)
11 (m,n)smn, (16)
where J1 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1,m+ n ≥ 4},
s
(123)
11 =
(a1a
′
2b1b
′
2 − a
′
1a2b
′
1b2)S˜xx − b1b2(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)S˜xy − a1a2(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)S˜yx
a1b1(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
, (17)
and
f
(123)
11 (m,n) =
a2bn(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2) + amb1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b2b
′
n − b
′
2bn)
a1b1(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
. (18)
In these expressions, we use the superscript ∗(123) to
denote the result obtained with the first three equa-
tions from Eqs.(8-11). Under the conditions presented
in Eq.(3), we can easily find out that (a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2) ≥ 0,
(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2) ≥ 0, (a1a
′
m − a
′
1am) ≥ 0 for all m ≥ 1
and (b2b
′
n − b
′
2bn) ≥ 0 for all n ≥ 2. Then we know
that f
(123)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 hold for all (m,n) ∈ J1. With this
4fact, we obtain a lower bound from Eq.(16) by setting
smn = 0, (m,n) ∈ J1 such that
s11 = s
(123)
11 ≤ s11, (19)
where s
(123)
11 is defined by Eq.(17). This and Eq.(17) are
our major formulas for the decoy-state method imple-
mentation for MDI-QKD in this section.
Similarly, we can get other expressions with choosing
any other three equations from Eqs.(8-11). For example,
we choose Eqs.(8-9,11). By eliminating s12 and s21, we
get another expression of s11 such that
s11 = s
(124)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J1
f
(124)
11 (m,n)smn, (20)
where
s
(124)
11 =
b′1b
′
2(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)S˜xx + (a
′
1a2b1b
′
2 − a1a
′
2b
′
1b2)S˜xy − a1a2(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)S˜yy
a1b′1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
, (21)
and
f
(124)
11 (m,n) =
a2b
′
n(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2) + amb
′
1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b2b
′
n − b
′
2bn)
a1b′1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
. (22)
Under the conditions presented in Eq.(3), we can also
find out that f
(124)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J1. Then
we know that s
(124)
11 is alos a lower bound of s11. On the
other hand, by comparing f
(123)
11 (m,n) and f
(124)
11 (m,n),
we have
f
(123)
11 (m,n)− f
(124)
11 (m,n)
= −
a2(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)
a1b1b′1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)
≤ 0, (23)
for any (m,n) ∈ J1. Then we know that
s
(123)
11 ≥ s
(124)
11 , (24)
with Eq.(16) and Eq.(20). With the relation presented
in Eq.(24) we know that the lower bound s
(123)
11 is tighter
than the lower bound s
(124)
11 . In the same way, we can get
another two lower bounds s
(134)
11 and s
(234)
11 of s11 with
Eqs.(8,10-11) and Eqs.(9-11) respectively. Furthermore,
we can also prove that
s
(123)
11 ≥ s
(134)
11 , s
(123)
11 ≥ s
(234)
11 . (25)
Now we only consider Eq.(8) and Eq.(11). By elimi-
nating s12 or s21 respectively, we get two expressions of
s11 such that
s11 = s
(14a)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J2
f
(14a)
11 (m,n)smn, (26)
s11 = s
(14b)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J2
f
(14a)
11 (m,n)smn, (27)
where J2 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1,m+ n ≥ 3},
s
(14a)
11 =
a′1b
′
2S˜xx − a1b2S˜yy
a1a′1(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
, (28)
s
(14b)
11 =
a′2b
′
1S˜xx − a2b1S˜yy
b1b′1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)
, (29)
and
f
(14a)
11 (m,n) =
a1b2a
′
mb
′
n − a
′
1b
′
2ambn
a1a′1(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
, (30)
f
(14b)
11 (m,n) =
a2b1a
′
mb
′
n − a
′
2b
′
1ambn
b1b′1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)
. (31)
For any sources used in the protocol, we must have either
Ka =
a′1b
′
2
a1b2
≤
a′2b
′
1
a2b1
= Kb or Ka ≥ Kb. Suppose the former
one holds, we can easily find out that f
(14a)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 for
all (m,n) ∈ J2 and s
(14a)
11 is a lower bound of s11. On the
other hand, if Ka ≥ Kb holds, we have f
(14b)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0
for all (m,n) ∈ J2 and s
(14b)
11 is a lower bound of s11.
Considering the following two relations
Ka −Kb =
a′1a2b1b
′
2 − a1a
′
2b
′
1b2
a1a2b1b2
, (32)
and
f
(14a)
11 (m,n)− f
(14b)
11 (m,n)
=
(a1a
′
mb1b
′
n − a
′
1amb
′
1bn)(a
′
1a2b1b
′
2 − a1a
′
2b
′
1b2)
a1a′1b1b
′
1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,(33)
we know that Ka−Kb and f
(14a)
11 − f
(14b)
11 have the same
sign which means that they are both positive or negative
simultaneously. Then we can write the lower bound of
5s11 with Eq.(8) and Eq.(11) into the following compact
form
s
(14)
11 = min{s
(14a)
11 , s
(14b)
11 }, (34)
that is the result presented in Ref. [19]. In the coming,
we will prove that the lower bound s
(123)
11 given in Eq.(17)
is more tightly than s
(14)
11 . Firstly, if we suppose Ka ≤
Kb holds, then we know that a
′
1a2b1b
′
2 ≤ a1a
′
2b
′
1b2 and
s
(14)
11 = s
(14a)
11 . For any (m,n) ∈ J1 we have
f
(123)
11 (m,n)− f
(14a)
11 (m,n)
= −
(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)Da
a1a′1b1(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
, (35)
where Da = (a1a
′
2b1b2b
′
n + a
′
1a2b
′
1b2bn − a
′
1a2b1b
′
2bn −
a′1a2b1b2b
′
n) ≥ b2(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn). Then we
know that
f
(123)
11 (m,n)− f
(14a)
11 (m,n)
≤ −
b2(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)
a1a′1b1(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
≤ 0. (36)
We can easily know that s
(123)
11 ≥ s
(14)
11 when Ka ≤ Kb
with this equation. Secondly, if we suppose Ka ≥
Kb holds, we can easily prove that f
(123)
11 (m,n) −
f
(14b)
11 (m,n) ≤ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J1 within the same way.
Then we get s
(123)
11 ≥ s
(14)
11 when Ka ≥ Kb.
In the last part of this section, we will derive another
lower bound of s11 with those four Eqs.(8-11). The idea
presented in Refs. [19, 24] inspire us to do the following
deduction
S˜yy − S˜xx = (a
′
1b
′
1 − a1b1)s11 +
∑
n≥2
(a′1b
′
n − a1bn)s1n +
∑
m≥2
(a′mb
′
1 − amb1)sm1 +
∑
m,n≥2
(a′mb
′
n − ambn)smn
≥ (a′1b
′
1 − a1b1)s11 +A
∑
n≥2
(a′1bn + a1b
′
n)s1n +B
∑
m≥2
(a′mb1 + amb
′
1)sm1 + C
∑
m,n≥2
(a′mbn + amb
′
n)smn
≥ (a′1b
′
1 − a1b1)s11 + α

∑
n≥2
(a′1bn + a1b
′
n)s1n +
∑
m≥2
(a′mb1 + amb
′
1)sm1 +
∑
m,n≥2
(a′mbn + amb
′
n)smn


= (a′1b
′
1 − a1b1)s11 + α
(
S˜xy − a1b
′
1s11 + S˜yx − a
′
1b1s11
)
= [a′1b
′
1 − a1b1 − α(a1b
′
1 + a
′
1b1)] s11 + α(S˜xy + S˜yx), (37)
where we have used the condition presented in Eq.(3),
and α = min{A,B,C} with
A =
a′1b
′
2 − a1b2
a′1b2 + a1b
′
2
, B =
a′2b
′
1 − a2b1
a′2b1 + a2b
′
1
, C =
a′2b
′
2 − a2b2
a′2b2 + a2b
′
2
.
Actually, under the condition in Eq.(3), we know that
A− C = −
(b22 + b
′
2
2)(a1a
′
2 − a
′
1a2)
(a′1b2 + a1b
′
2)(a
′
2b2 + a2b
′
2)
≤ 0,
B − C = −
(a22 + a
′
2
2
)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
(a′2b1 + a2b
′
1)(a
′
2b2 + a2b
′
2)
≤ 0.
Then α can be written as α = min{A,B}. According
to the relation presented in Eq.(37), we obtain the other
expression of s11
s11 = s
(α)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J2
f
(α)
11 (m,n)smn, (38)
where
s
(α)
11 =
S˜xx − S˜yy + α(S˜xy + S˜yx)
a1b1 − a′1b
′
1 + α(a1b
′
1 + a
′
1b1)
, (39)
and
f
(α)
11 (m,n) = −
ambn − a′ma
′
n + α(amb
′
n + a
′
mbn)
a1b1 − a′1b
′
1 + α(a1b
′
1 + a
′
1b1)
. (40)
With the condition presented in Eq.(3), we can easily
prove that f
(α)
11 (m,n) ≥ 0 for all (m,n) ∈ J2. So we
know that s
(α)
11 is the other lower bound of s11. In the
coming, we will discuss the relation among s
(α)
11 , s
(14)
11 and
s
(123)
11 .
Firstly, we consider the special case with ak = bk and
a′k = b
′
k for any k ≥ 1. In this case, we have Ka = Kb =
a′1a
′
2
a1a2
, A = B =
a′1a
′
2−a1a2
a′1a2+a1a
′
2
and
f
(α)
11 (m,n)− f
(14)
11 (m,n)
=
(a′1a
′
2 − a1a2)(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(a1a
′
n − a
′
1an)
a1a′1(a
2
1 + a
′
1
2)(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)
≥ 0,
for any (m,n) ∈ J2. Then we know that s
(14)
11 ≥ s
(α)
11 in
this case.
6Secondly, for the general case, we can prove that
s
(123)
11 ≥ s
(α)
11 . (41)
In the situation with A ≤ B, we have
A−B =
DA1 −DA2
(a′1b2 + a1b
′
2)(a
′
2b1 + a2b
′
1)
≤ 0,
where DA1 = a
′
1a2b1b2−a1a
′
2b1b2−a1a2b
′
1b2+a1a2b1b
′
2+
a′1a
′
2b1b
′
2, and DA2 = a
′
1a
′
2b
′
1b2 − a
′
1a2b
′
1b
′
2 + a1a
′
2b
′
1b
′
2.
With this condition, we can do the following calculation
f
(α=A)
11 (m,n)− f
(123)
11 (m,n)
= −
(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(a1bnDA1 +DA3)
a1b1(a21 + a
′
1
2)(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
≥ −
(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(a1bnDA2 +DA3)
a1b1(a21 + a
′
1
2)(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
=
(a1b
′
2 + a
′
1b2)(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)
a1b1(a21 + a
′
1
2)(b1b′2 − b
′
1b2)
≥ 0 (42)
On the other hand, in the situation with A ≥ B, we have
A−B =
DB1 −DB2
(a′1b2 + a1b
′
2)(a
′
2b1 + a2b
′
1)
≥ 0,
where DB1 = a
′
1a2b1b2−a1a
′
2b1b2−a1a2b
′
1b2+a1a2b1b
′
2−
a1a
′
2b
′
1b
′
2, and DA2 = a
′
1a
′
2b
′
1b2 − a
′
1a
′
2b1b
′
2 − a
′
1a2b
′
1b
′
2.
With this condition, we can do the following calculation
f
(α=B)
11 (m,n)− f
(123)
11 (m,n)
=
(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)(b1amDB1 +DB3)
a1b1(b21 + b
′
1
2)(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
≥
(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)(b1amDB2 +DB3)
a1b1(b21 + b
′
1
2)(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
=
(a2b
′
1 + a
′
2b1)(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)
a1b1(b21 + b
′
1
2)(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)
≥ 0 (43)
Summing up the results presented in Eq.(42) and
Eq.(43), we complete the proof of Eq.(41).
In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need
the upper bound of error rate caused by the two single-
photon pulses, say e11. Similar to the total gain, the total
error rate with source αβ chosen by Alice and Bob can
be written as [18]
T˜xx = a1b1t11 + a1b2t12 + a2b1t21 + a2b2t22 +Kxx,(44)
T˜xy = a1b
′
1t11 + a1b
′
2t12 + a2b
′
1t21 + a2b
′
2t22 +Kxy,(45)
T˜yx = a
′
1b1t11 + a
′
1b2t12 + a
′
2b1t21 + a
′
2b2t22 +Kyx,(46)
T˜yy = a
′
1b
′
1t11 + a
′
1b
′
2t12 + a
′
2b
′
1t21 + a
′
2b
′
2t22 +Kyy,(47)
where Tαβ = EαβSαβ , tmn = smnemn,
T˜xx = Txx − a0T0x − b0Tx0 + a0b0T00, (48)
T˜xy = Txy − a0T0y − b
′
0Tx0 + a0b
′
0T00, (49)
T˜yx = Tyx − a
′
0T0x − b0Ty0 + a
′
0b0T00, (50)
T˜yy = Tyy − a
′
0T0y − b
′
0Ty0 + a
′
0b
′
0T00, (51)
and
Kxx =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
ambntmn, Kxy =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
amb
′
ntmn,
Kyx =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
a′mbntmn, Kyy =
∑
(m,n)∈J0
a′mb
′
ntmn,
with J0 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 1, n ≥ 1,m + n ≥ 4, (m,n) 6=
(2, 2)}. According to Eq.(44), we can find out the upper
bound of e11 such that
e11 ≤ e
(1)
11 =
T˜xx
a1b1s11
= e11. (52)
In the protocol, there are two different bases. We de-
note sZ11 and s
X
11 for yields of single-photon pulse pairs
in the Z and X bases, respectively. Consider those post-
selected bits cased by source xAxB in the Z basis. After
an error test, we know the bit-flip error rate of this set,
say TZxAxB = E
Z
xAxB
SZxAxB . We also need the phase-flip
rate for the subset of bits which are caused by the two
single-photon pulse, say eph11 , which is equal to the flip
rate of post-selected bits caused by a single photon in
the X basis, say eX11. Given this, we can now calculate
the key rate by the well-know formula. For example, for
those post-selected bits caused by source yAyB, it is
R = a′1b
′
1s
Z
11[1−H(e
X
11)]− S
Z
yAyB
fH(EZyAyB ), (53)
where f is the efficiency factor of the error correction
method used.
III. EXACT MINIMUM OF YIELD WITH ONLY
3 STATES FOR MDI-QKD
In the previous section, we show the lower bound of
yield s11 and the upper bound of error rate e11 with ex-
plicit formulas. The lower bound s
(123)
11 is obtained with
Eqs.(8-10) by setting smn = 0, where (m,n) ∈ J1. The
upper bound of e
(1)
11 is obtained with Eq.(44) by setting
emn = 0, where (m,n) ∈ J2. Obviously, the condition
with source yAyB does not used in deriving s
(123)
11 and
e
(1)
11 . Keeping sight of this fact, we suspect that a more
tightly bound can be found out with considering all rela-
tions given by Eqs.(8-11) (or Eqs.(44-47)). In the rest of
this section, we will present an explicit algorithm within
a finite number of steps to get an exact minimum of yield
s11. An an exact maximum of error rate e11 will be given
in the next section.
According to Eqs.(8-11), we can find out the expression
7of s11, s12, s21 and s22 uniquely
s11 = s
(1234)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(1234)
11 (m,n)smn, (54)
s12 = s
(1234)
12 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(1234)
12 (m,n)smn, (55)
s21 = s
(1234)
21 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(1234)
21 (m,n)smn, (56)
s22 = s
(1234)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(1234)
22 (m,n)smn, (57)
where
s
(1234)
11 =
a′2b
′
2S˜xx − a
′
2b2S˜xy − a2b
′
2S˜yx + a2b2S˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
s
(1234)
12 =
−a′2b
′
1S˜xx + a
′
2b1S˜xy + a2b
′
1S˜yx − a2b1S˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
s
(1234)
21 =
−a′1b
′
2S˜xx + a
′
1b2S˜xy + a1b
′
2S˜yx − a1b2S˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
s
(1234)
22 =
a′1b
′
1S˜xx − a
′
1b1S˜xy − a1b
′
1S˜yx + a1b1S˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
and
f
(1234)
11 (m,n) = −
(a2a
′
m − a
′
2am)(b2b
′
n − b
′
2bn)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,(58)
f
(1234)
12 (m,n) = −
(a2a
′
m − a
′
2am)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,(59)
f
(1234)
21 (m,n) = −
(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b2b
′
n − b
′
2bn)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,(60)
f
(1234)
22 (m,n) = −
(a1a
′
m − a
′
1am)(b1b
′
n − b
′
1bn)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
.(61)
In the following, we denote the superscript (1234) by (∗)
for short.
In order to estimate the lower bound of s11, we
need present some properties about the functions
f
(∗)
11 (m,n), f
(∗)
12 (m,n), f
(∗)
21 (m,n), f
(∗)
22 (m,n). With the
condition given by Eq.(3), we know that f
(∗)
11 (2, k) =
f
(∗)
11 (k, 2) = 0 for all k ≥ 3, f
(∗)
11 (1, k) ≥ 0, f
(∗)
11 (k, 1) ≥ 0
for all k ≥ 3 and f
(∗)
11 (m,n) ≤ 0 for all m,n ≥ 3.
Similarly, we know that f
(∗)
12 (1, k) ≤ 0, f
(∗)
12 (k, 1) =
f
(∗)
12 (2, k) = 0, f
(∗)
12 (k, 2) ≥ 0, f
(∗)
12 (m,n) ≥ 0, f
(∗)
21 (k, 1) ≤
0, f
(∗)
21 (1, k) = f
(∗)
21 (k, 2) = 0, f
(∗)
21 (2, k) ≥ 0, f
(∗)
21 (m,n) ≥
0, f
(∗)
22 (1, k) = f
(∗)
22 (k, 1) = 0 for all k,m, n ≥ 3 and
f
(∗)
22 (m,n) ≤ 0 for all m,n ≥ 2. With these facts, we can
find out a lower bound of s11 by setting s1k = sk1 =
0, (k ≥ 3) and smn = 1, (m,n ≥ 3) crudely. Actu-
ally, all of smn, (m,n ≥ 3) do not have to equal to 1
at the same time as the constraint conditions such that
s12, s21, s22 ∈ [0, 1]. So the problem of estimating the
lower bound of s11 can be written into the following con-
strained optimization problem (COP)


min: s11 = s
(∗)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J3
f
(∗)
11 (m,n)smn
st: s22 = s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈J3
f
(∗)
22 (m,n)smn ≥ 0,
(62)
where J3 = {(m,n)|m ≥ 2, n ≥ 2, (m,n) 6= (2, 2)}. In
this COP problem, there are infinite number of variables.
If s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈J3
f
(∗)
22 ≥ 0, the problem can be solved
by taking smn = 1 for all (m,n) ∈ J3. But in practice,
this trivial situation never or almost never occur.
Generally, we can not solve this COP problem analyti-
cally. In what follows we will show that the problem can
be solved by explicit algorithm. Still, as shown below,
it can always be determined within a finite number of
steps.
A. Definition of the lower bound
In order to solve this COP problem presented in
Eq.(62), we need analysis the ratio
h
(22)
11 (m,n) =
f
(∗)
11 (m,n)
f
(∗)
22 (m,n)
= ha(m) · hb(n), (63)
where
ha(m) =
a2a
′
m − a
′
2am
a1a′m − a
′
1am
, hb(n) =
b2b
′
n − b
′
2bn
b1b′n − b
′
1bn
. (64)
Under the condition in Eq.(3), we can easily prove that
ha(k), hb(k) are two nonnegative monotone increasing
functions of variable k ≥ 3. This fact tells that sm+1,n
and sm,n+1 have priority to be equal to 1 over smn in or-
der to minimize s11 in Eq.(62). Back to the COP prob-
lem, we can solve it by introducing the following three
subsets JL, Js = {(ms, ns)}, JU of J3 and one positive
real number sL ∈ (0, 1] such that
h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈ JL) ≤ h
(22)
11 (ms, ns)
≤ h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈ JU ), (65)
with J3 = JL ∪ Js ∪ JU and
s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈JU
f
(∗)
22 (m,n) > 0 (66)
s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈JU∪Js
f
(∗)
22 (m,n) ≤ 0 (67)
s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈JU
f
(∗)
22 (m,n) + sLf
(∗)
22 (ms, ns) = 0. (68)
Then we can define the lower bound of s11 by
s∗11 = s
(∗)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈JU
f
(∗)
11 (m,n) + sLf
(∗)
11 (ms, ns). (69)
8With the definitions of JL, Js, JU given by Eqs.(65-68),
we know that the set J3 is decomposed into three subsets
JL, Js, JU . It’s important to point out that the subsets
JL, Js, JU need not be unique but the lower bound s
∗
11
given by Eq.(69) is always uniquely determined. If the
subsets JL, Js, JU have two different choices which are
denoted by JL1 , Js1 , JU1 and JL1 , Js1 , JU1 , then we must
have
h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈ JL12) = h
(22)
11 (ms1 , ns1)
= h
(22)
11 (ms2 , ns2) = h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈ JU12), (70)
and the number of elements in the two sets JL1 , JL2 are
the same, the number of elements in the two sets JU1 , JU2
are also the same. In Eq.(70), JL12 = (JL1−JL2)∪(JL2−
JL1) contains the elements that only included in JL1 or
only in JL2 and JU12 = (JU1 −JU2)∪(JU2 −JU1) contains
the elements that only included in JU1 or only in JU2 .
Here and after in this article, we use A−B to denote the
set which contains the elements in A but not in B. So
we get sL1 = sL2 and∑
(m,n)∈JU1
f
(∗)
11 (m,n) + sL1f
(∗)
11 (ms1 , ns1)
=
∑
(m,n)∈JU2
f
(∗)
11 (m,n) + sL2f
(∗)
11 (ms1 , ns1). (71)
With this fact, we can conclude that the lower bound s∗11
given by Eq.(69) is uniquely.
B. An algorithm for finding JL, Js, JU and sL
In order to confirm the value of s∗11, we need to deter-
mine the elements in sets JL, Js, JU and the proper value
of sL. In the following, we will present an algorithm for
finding it within finite steps.
Though we have known that h
(22)
11 (m + 1, n) ≥
h
(22)
11 (m,n) and h
(22)
11 (m,n + 1) ≥ h
(22)
11 (m,n) for any
(m,n) ∈ J3. But we can not pick the larger one between
h
(22)
11 (m + 1, n) and h
(22)
11 (m,n + 1) unless we preset the
sources used by Alice and Bob. Fortunately, this defects
does not affect us to derive the algorithm within finite
steps.
In order to describe the algorithm clearly, we need to
do the following preparations. Firstly, we define two lim-
its
hˆa = lim
m→∞
ha(m), hˆb = lim
n→∞
hb(n), (72)
where ha(m) and hb(n) are defined in Eq.(64). As dis-
cussed before, we know that ha(k), hb(k) are two nonneg-
ative monotone increasing functions of k ≥ 3. Further-
more, under the condition in Eq.(3), we can also prove
that ha(a
′
m, am) is monotone increasing about a
′
m ∈ [0, 1]
and monotone decreasing about am ∈ [0, 1]. Then we
can find out a upper bound of the function ha such that
ha(a
′
m, am) ≤ a2/a1. By the same way, we also have
hb(b
′
n, bn) ≤ b2/b1. The functions ha(k) is nonnegative
monotone increasing function with finite upper bound
which means that the limitations of it must be exist. And
the same for hb(k). This complete the proof of Eq.(72).
Explicitly, if Alice and Bob send out coherent pulses, we
have hˆa = (a
′
2 − a2)/(a
′
1 − a1), hˆb = (b
′
2 − b2)/(b
′
1 − b1).
Secondly, we also need the notations
Fc(m0, n0) =
∑
m≥m0
f
(∗)
22 (m,n0), (73)
Fr(m0, n0) =
∑
n≥n0
f
(∗)
22 (m0, n). (74)
Considering the normalizing conditions
∑
k≥0
xk = 1, (x = a, b, a
′, b′), (75)
we can calculate Fc(m0, n0), Fr(m0, n0) by the following
explicit formulas
Fc(m0, n0) = −
(a1a¯
′
m0
− a′1a¯m0)(b1b
′
n0
− b′1bn0)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,(76)
Fr(m0, n0) = −
(a1a
′
m0
− a′1am0)(b1b¯
′
n0
− b′1b¯n0)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,(77)
where x¯k0 = 1−
∑k0−1
k=0 xk, (x = a, b, a
′, b′).
Furthermore, for given JL, Js and JU we introduce
a vector Vs with ls elements and two natural number
mJ , nJ such that
mJ = min
(m,n)∈JU
m, nJ = min
(m,n)∈JU
n. (78)
The number ls is defined by
ls = max
(m≥mJ ,n≥nJ )∈JL
n. (79)
The k-th element of Vs can be defined by
Vs(k) =


min(m,k)∈JU m, 2 ≤ k < ls,
mJ , k = ls.
(80)
Actually, with given the vector Vs, we know that Js =
{(ms, ns)} can only be one element chosen from the fol-
lowing set
Jˆs = {(m,n) = (Vs(k), k)|nJ ≤ k ≤ ls}. (81)
With Jˆs, we define three sets which contain only one
element in each of them as follows
Ks = {(k, l)|h
(22)
11 (k, l) = min
(m,n)∈Jˆs
h
(22)
11 (m,n)}, (82)
Kc = {(k, l)|h
(22)
11 (k, l) = min
(m,n)∈Jˆ
(c)
s
h
(22)
11 (m,n)},(83)
Kr = {(k, l)|h
(22)
11 (k, l) = min
(m,n)∈Jˆ
(r)
s
h
(22)
11 (m,n)},(84)
9where Jˆs is defined in Eq.(81), and Jˆ
(c)
s = Jˆs −
{(Vs(nJ), nJ )}, Jˆ
(r)
s = Jˆs − {(Vs(ls), ls)},
Finally, for given Js and JU , we define
G(JU ) = s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈JU
f
(∗)
22 (m,n), (85)
Gs(Js, JU ) = s
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈Js∪JU
f
(∗)
22 (m,n). (86)
With these preparations, we are ready to present the
algorithm as follows.
Algorithm.
Step1. Initially, we have JL = ∅, Js =
{(m,n)|h
(∗)
11 (m,n) = min[h
(∗)
11 (2, 3), h
(∗)
11 (3, 2)]}, JU =
J3 − Js, and ls = 2, if Js = {(2, 3)}, Vs = (3, 3), else
if Js = {(3, 2)}, Vs = (4, 2) and mJ = nJ = 2. Calcu-
late Gs using Eq.(86). Actually, with JL = ∅, Gs can be
calculated by the following explicit formula
Gs = s
(∗)
22 −
(a1a¯
′
2 − a
′
1a¯2)(b1b¯
′
2 − b
′
1b¯2)
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
+ 1. (87)
As discussed before, we suppose G′ = G(L3) < 0
initially. After these preparations, we initialize Gf with
Gf = G(JU ) according to Eq.(85). If Gf < 0 we goto
Step2, else we goto Step3.
Step2. Find out J ′s = {(m
′
s, n
′
s)} such
that f
(∗)
22 (m
′
s, n
′
s) = min(m,n)∈JU f
(∗)
22 (m,n) =
min(m,n)∈Jˆs f
(∗)
22 (m,n), where Jˆs is defined in Eq.(81).
So we need to find out the set Fˆs. Firstly, we check that
the following two inequalities fulfilled or not,
h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈ Kr) ≥ ha(Vs(nJ)) · hˆb, (88)
h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈ Kc) ≥ hˆa · hb(ls), (89)
where ha(k), hb(k) are defined in Eq.(64) and hˆa, hˆb are
defined in Eq.(72). If IEq.(88) holds, we goto Step2.1,
else if IEq.(89) holds, we goto Step2.2, else we goto
Step2.3.
Step2.1. In this situation, we know that h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈
Kr) is greater than all the values h
(22)
11 (Vs(ls), k) for all
k ≥ 2. We need to calculate the value
G′(JU ) = Gf −
∑
(m,n)∈Jr
f
(∗)
22 (m,n), (90)
where Jr = {(m,n)|m = Vs(ls), n ≥ ls}. If G′(JU ) ≤ 0
we need remove all the elements in Jr from the set of JU .
Then we can renew the values with mJ = mJ + 1, nJ =
nJ , ls = ls− 1, JL = JL ∪ Jr, Js = Kr, JU = J3 − JL− Js
and Gf = Gf − f
(∗)
22 ((m,n) ∈ Js). If Gf < 0, we go
back to step2, else we goto Step3. On the other hand, if
G′(JU ) > 0, then we know that the element in the final
set of Js must be included in Jr. In this case we need
to renew JL = JL ∪ Js, Js = {(Vs(ls), ls)}, JU = JU −
Js, Vs(ls) = Vs(ls) + 1, ls = ls+1, Vs(ls) = Vs(ls− 1)− 1,
and Gf = Gf − f
(∗)
22 ((m,n) ∈ Js). If Gf < 0, we go back
to step2, else we goto Step3.
Step2.2. In this situation, we know that h
(22)
11 ((m,n) ∈
Kc) is greater than all the values h
(22)
11 (k, nJ) for all k ≥ 2.
We need to calculate the value
G′(JU ) = Gf −
∑
(m,n)∈Jc
f
(∗)
22 (m,n), (91)
where Jc = {(m,n)|m ≥ Vs(nJ), n = nJ}. If G′(JU ) ≤ 0
we need remove all the elements in Jc from the set of
JU . Then we can renew the values with mJ = mJ , nJ =
nJ +1, ls = ls, JL = JL ∪ Jc, Js = Kc, JU = J3 − JL − Js
and Gf = Gf − f
(∗)
22 ((m,n) ∈ Js). If Gf < 0, we go
back to step2, else we goto Step3. On the other hand,
if G′(JU ) > 0, then we know that the element in the
final set of Js must be included in Jc. In this case we
need to renew JL = JL ∪ Js, Js = {(Vs(nJ), nJ )}, JU =
JU − Js, Vs(nJ) = Vs(nJ) + 1, ls = ls, and Gf =
Gf − f
(∗)
22 ((m,n) ∈ Js). If Gf < 0, we go back to step2,
else we goto Step3.
Step2.3. In this situation, we should renew JL = JL ∪
Js, Js = Ks, JU = JU − Js. Denoting Ks = {(km, kn)},
we can renew ls and Vs by the following method. If
kn = ls, we have Vs(ls) = Vs(ls) + 1, ls = ls + 1, Vs(ls) =
Vs(ls−1)−1. If kn < ls, we have Vs(kn) = Vs(kn)+1, ls =
ls. Finally, we renew Gf = Gf − f
(∗)
22 ((m,n) ∈ Js). If
Gf < 0, we go back to step2, else we goto Step3.
Step3. Now we have already find out the final sets
JL, Js, JU with Step2. In this step, we will calculate
the value of sL. According to the relation presented in
Eq.(68), we should define
sL = −
Gf
f
(∗)
22 ((m,n) ∈ Js)
. (92)
Then we can calculate the lower bound s∗11 of s11 by using
Eq.(69).
IV. EXACT MAXIMUM ERROR RATE WITH
ONLY 3 STATES FOR MDI-QKD
In section 2, we show the upper bound of error rate
e11 with explicit formula. The upper bound of e
(1)
11
is obtained with Eq.(44) by setting emn = 0, where
(m,n) ∈ J2. Obviously, the condition with source yA
and yB does not used in deriving e
(1)
11 . Keeping sight of
this fact, we suspect that a more tightly bound can be
found out with considering all relations given by Eqs.(44-
47). In the rest of this section, we will present that we
can find out an exact maximum of error rate e11 within
a finite number steps.
According to Eqs.(44-47), we can find out the expres-
10
sion of t11, t12, t21 and t22 uniquely
t11 = t
(∗)
11 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(∗)
11 (m,n)tmn, (93)
t12 = t
(∗)
12 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(∗)
12 (m,n)tmn, (94)
t21 = t
(∗)
21 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(∗)
21 (m,n)tmn, (95)
t22 = t
(∗)
22 +
∑
(m,n)∈J0
f
(∗)
22 (m,n)tmn, (96)
where
t
(∗)
11 =
a′2b
′
2T˜xx − a
′
2b2T˜xy − a2b
′
2T˜yx + a2b2T˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
t
(∗)
12 =
−a′2b
′
1T˜xx + a
′
2b1T˜xy + a2b
′
1T˜yx − a2b1T˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
t
(∗)
21 =
−a′1b
′
2T˜xx + a
′
1b2T˜xy + a1b
′
2T˜yx − a1b2T˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
t
(∗)
22 =
a′1b
′
1T˜xx − a
′
1b1T˜xy − a1b
′
1T˜yx + a1b1T˜yy
(a1a′2 − a
′
1a2)(b1b
′
2 − b
′
1b2)
,
and f
(∗)
11 (m,n), f
(∗)
12 (m,n), f
(∗)
21 (m,n), f
(∗)
22 (m,n) are de-
fined by Eqs(58-61).
With the properties of the functions
f
(∗)
11 (m,n), f
(∗)
12 (m,n), f
(∗)
21 (m,n), f
(∗)
22 (m,n) discussed
in the previous section, we can find out a upper
bound of t11 by setting t1k = tk1 = 1, (k ≥ 3) and
tmn = 0, (m,n ≥ 3) crudely. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, all of t1k, tk1, (k ≥ 3) do not have to equal
to 1 at the same time as the constraint conditions such
that t12, t21, t22 ∈ [0, 1]. So the problem of estimating
the upper bound of t11 can be written into the following
constrained optimization problem (COP)

max: t11 = t
(∗)
11 +
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
11 (1, k)t1k + f
(∗)
11 (k, 1)tk1,
st: t12 = t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
12 (1, k)t1k ≥ 0,
t12 = t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
21 (k, 1)tk1 ≥ 0,
(97)
In this COP problem, there are infinite number of vari-
ables. Considering the independence between variables
t1k and tk1, the COP problem in Eq.(97) can be decom-
posed into the following two COP problems

max: t1 =
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
11 (1, k)t1k,
st: t12 = t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
12 (1, k)t1k ≥ 0,
(98)
and 

max: t2 =
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
11 (k, 1)tk1,
st: t12 = t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k≥3
f
(∗)
21 (k, 1)tk1 ≥ 0,
(99)
In order to solve the COP problems, we need analy-
sis the ratio f
(∗)
11 (1, k)/f
(∗)
12 (1, k) and f
(∗)
11 (k, 1)/f
(∗)
21 (k, 1).
Actually, we have
f
(∗)
11 (1, k)
f
(∗)
12 (1, k)
= −hb(b
′
k, bk),
f
(∗)
11 (k, 1)
f
(∗)
21 (k, 1)
= −ha(a
′
k, ak),
where ha, hb are defined in Eq.(64). As discussed before,
under the condition in Eq.(3), ha(k), hb(k) are two non-
negative monotone increasing functions of variable k ≥ 3.
This fact predicts that t1,k+1 (tk+1,1) has priority to be
equal to 1 over t1,k (tk,1) in order to maximize t1 (t2).
Back to the COP problems, we can solve them by intro-
ducing two neutral numbers ka, kb and two positive real
numbers sa, sb ∈ (0, 1] such that


t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k>kb
f
(∗)
12 (1, k) > 0
t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k≥kb
f
(∗)
12 (1, k) ≤ 0
t
(∗)
12 +
∑
k≥kb
f
(∗)
12 (1, k) + sbf
(∗)
12 (1, kb) = 0,
(100)
and

t
(∗)
21 +
∑
k>ka
f
(∗)
21 (k, 1) > 0
t
(∗)
21 +
∑
k≥ka
f
(∗)
21 (k, 1) ≤ 0
t
(∗)
21 +
∑
k≥ka
f
(∗)
21 (k, 1) + saf
(∗)
21 (ka, 1) = 0.
(101)
Then we can define the upper bound of t11 by
t∗11 = t
(∗)
11 +
∑
k≥kb
f
(∗)
11 (1, k) + sbf
(∗)
11 (1, kb)
+
∑
k≥ka
f
(∗)
11 (k, 1) + saf
(∗)
11 (ka, 1), (102)
where ka, kb and sa, sb are defined in Eqs.(100-101) which
can be easily find out by using the Algorithm presented
in the previous section.
After getting the lower bound of s11 and the upper
bound of t11, we can easily obtain the upper bound of
the error rate e11 such that
e
(∗)
11 = t
(∗)
11
/
s
(∗)
11 , (103)
where s
(∗)
11 is defined in Eq.(69) and t
(∗)
11 is defined in
Eq.(102).
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we will present some numerical simu-
lations to comparing our results with the pre-existing re-
sults [19, 24]. Below for simplicity, we suppose that Alice
and Bob use the coherent sources. The UTP locates in
the middle of Alice and Bob, and the UTP’s detectors are
identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rate and de-
tection efficiency, and their detection efficiency does not
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Total transmission loss (dB)
Th
e 
lo
w
er
 b
ou
nd
 o
f s
11
 
 
Sun
Wang
Our: Eq.(19) & Eq.(52)
Our: Eq.(69) & Eq.(103)
Infinite decoy
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Total transmission loss (dB)
Th
e 
lo
w
er
 b
ou
nd
 o
f s
11
 
 
Sun
Wang
Our: Eq.(19) & Eq.(52)
Our: Eq.(69) & Eq.(103)
Infinite decoy
FIG. 1: (Color online) The estimated parameter of s11 versus
the total channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy
state MDI-QKD.
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations: e0 is the error rate of background, ed is the
misalignment-error probability; pd is the dark count rate per
detector; f is the error correction inefficiency.
e0 ed pd f
0.5 1.5% 3.0× 10−6 1.16
depend on the incoming signals. We shall estimate what
values would be probably observed for the gains and er-
ror rates in the normal cases by the linear models as
in [5, 18, 24]:
|n〉〈n| =
n∑
k=0
Cknξ
k(1− ξ)n−k|k〉〈k|
where ξk is the transmittance for a distance from Al-
ice to the UTB. For fair comparison, we use the same
parameter values used in [18, 24] for our numerical eval-
uation, which follow the experiment reported in [28]. For
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The relative value between estimated
parameter of s11 and the asymptotic limit of the infinite
decoy-state method versus the total channel transmission loss
using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD.
simplicity, we shall put the detection efficiency to the
overall transmittance η = ξ2ζ. We assume all detec-
tors have the same detection efficiency ζ and dark count
rate pd. The values of these parameters are presented
in Table I. With this, the total gains Sωµi,νj , (ω = X,Z)
and error rates Sωµi,νjE
ω
µi,νj
, (ω = X,Z) of Alice’s inten-
sity µi(i = 0, 1, 2) and Bob’s intensity νj(j = 0, 1, 2) can
be calculated. By using these values, we can estimate
the lower bounds of yield sZ11 with Eq.(19) and Eq.(69).
Also, we can estimate the upper bounds of error rate eX11
with Eq.(52) and Eq.(103). The estimated parameters of
s11 and e11 are shown in Fig.1 and Fig.3, respectively,
which clearly shows that our methods are more tightly
than the pre-existed results. In order to see more clearly,
in Fig.2, we plot the relative value of s11 to the result
obtained with the infinite decoy-state method. We can
observe that our results are more close to the asymp-
totic limit of the infinite decoy-state method than the
pre-existed results. Moreover, we can find out that the
results given by the numerical method are more tightly
12
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The estimated parameter of e11 versus
the total channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy
state MDI-QKD.
than the analytical method. Furthermore, with these pa-
rameters, we can estimate the final key rate R of this pro-
tocol with Eq.(53) which is shown in Fig.4. In these four
figures, the blue dotted line is obtained by the method
presented in Ref. [24], the green dash-dot line is obtained
by the method presented in Ref. [19], the red dashed line
is obtained by the analytical method presented in sec-
tion 2 with Eq.(19) and Eq.(52), the black solid line is
obtained by the numerical method presented in section
3 with Eq.(69) and Eq.(103) and the magenta solid line
is the result obtained by the infinite decoy-state method.
In the simulation, the densities used by Alice and Bob
are assigned to µ1 = ν1 = 0.1, µ2 = ν2 = 0.5.
Furthermore, if we fix the densities of the decoy-state
pulses used by Alice and Bob, the final key rate will
change with Alice and Bob taking different densities for
their single-state pulses. Here, we also take µ1 = ν1 = 0.1
and assume that µ2 = ν2 > µ1. In Fig.5, we present the
the optimal key rates with different methods. In order to
see more clearly, in Fig.6, we plot the relative value of the
optimal key rate to the result obtained with the infinite
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The estimated key rate R versus chan-
nel transmission using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The optimal key rate versus the total
channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-
QKD.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The relative value between the optimal
key rate obtained with different methods and the asymptotic
limit of the infinite decoy-state method versus the total chan-
nel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-QKD.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) The optimal key rate versus the total
channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-
QKD.
decoy-state method. We can observe that our results are
better than the pre-existed results. The optimal densi-
ties with the optimal key rate versus the total channel
transmission loss is given in Fig.7.
VI. CONCLUSION
We study the MDI-QKD in practice with only 3 dif-
ferent states in implementing the decoy-state method.
Firstly, we present a more tightly analytical formulas for
the decoy-state method for two-pulse sources with 3 dif-
ferent states. Then we show an exact maximum of the
yield s11 and an exact minimum of the error rate e11 with
an efficient algorithm. These methods can be applied to
the recently proposed MDI-QKD with imperfect single-
photon source such as the coherent states or the heralded
states from the parametric down conversion. Finally, we
give some numerical simulations. The results show that
our methods are better than the pre-existing results.
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